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THE WORLD COURT AND A WORLD
OPPORTUNITY

N

By Wayne C. Williams of the Denver Bar
O American can contemplate the World Court in its
beginnings without thinking of the beginnings of our
own Supreme Court in the early days of the republic.
Many analogies have been drawn between the two courts,
just as many have been successfully drawn between the beginnings of the Federal union of states and the early years of
the League of Nations.
While the historical and constitutional analogies, present
fascinating studies the one to be drawn here is largely personal.
Is there a John Marshall on the bench of the World
Court? Is a Marshall needed there and is the opportunity
presented by that court, its origin, purposes and powers,
sufficient to cause us to expect that such a man will emerge to
mould the decrees of that Court into a new world order
wherein all nations will come to a common forum for the
judicial settlement of their disputes?
John Jay declined the Chief Justiceship of the United
States Supreme Court saying, "I left the bench perfectly convinced that under a system so defective, it would not obtain
the energy, weight and dignity, which is so essential to its
affording due support to the National government, nor acquire public confidence and respect."
The task from which Jay shrank, apealed to John Marshall.
No weakling could have given permanent force to the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Marbury vs Madison or
McCullough vs Maryland. No inferior personality could
ever have persuaded his colleagues on the Bench to arrive at
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these monumental decisions. It was Marshall's personality
and gifts that made his great Work possible.
It is a mistake to think of Marshall as forcing any opinions on his colleagues for while he had a dominating personality and a disposition not easily swayed yet he united to these
firm qualities a modesty, a deference to the views of others, a
tender heart and a most convivial nature-all graced by a
pleasing manner that charmed his bitterest opponents. There
was no undue or frosty dignity about Marshall and precisely
these qualities, noted by so many of his contemporaries, will be
valuable equipment for any judge on any bench who must
match minds with colleagues.
Given then a great mind, a peculiar union of dominating
but pleasing personality, and given also a great opportunity,
we shall find history being made, as Marshall made it, and
we are quite prepared to believe Mr. Justice Story when he
said"When may we again hope to see so much moderation with so much
firmness; so much sagacity with so much modesty; so much learning with so
much piety; so much wisdom with gentleness."

Let us glance at .the superb constitutional structure erected by the Marshall decisions:1. Supremacy of the Federal government, its constitution and laws. Emphasized in Fletcher v Peck, (6 Cranch
87), and in McCullough vs. Maryland (4 Wheaton 316).
2. Power of Federal Supreme Court to interpret the
constitution and laws of the United States and to declare a
law unconstitutional. (Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137).
3. State legislatures may not annul judgments of the
United States Courts. (Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87).
4. States may not tax instrumentalities of the Federal
government. (McCullough vs. Maryland).
5. The Federal government possesses inherent power to
function as a sovereign government and to do all things reasonable and necessary to function as such. (McCullough vs.
Maryland.)
6. The inviolability of all contracts. ("Dartmouth College case", 4 Wheaton 518).
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7. Power of the Supreme Court of the nation to pass
upon final judgments of state courts as to rights of all citizens
under Federal laws and the constitution. (Cohen vs Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264; a case that raised and decided fundamental principles and formed the whole distinction between
state and national legislatures and relative areas of power.)
8. The supreme power of the Federal government over
interstate commerce. (Gibbons vs Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1).
There are other great decisions but these are enough.
They clothed the nation with power and dignity and authority; they firmly established the nation's supremacy in its constitutional field and forever established the dignity and power
of the great court from which the decisions came.
The World Court faces a situation not unlike that which
faced Marshall on the American Supreme Bench. It is not
moulding a new world state and does not seek to and this fact
must ever be kept in mind as its decisions draw the nations
into closer and yet closer cooperation.
But only states can be parties before it and only international questions and rights arising out of international conventions, treaties and compacts, can be construed or enforced
by its decisions. It has separate nations, each sovereign in its
own right, to reconcile and never were nationalistic sentiments
or rights more strongly insisted upon than today. It is new
and its real powers are comparatively untried. It faces
hostility in many quarters of the world and in many nations
(not excepting our own) it faces the bitter opposition of certain eminent statesmen.
Sound reason was conspicuously a part of Marshall's
equipment and of his triumphs, and sound reason (always
good common sense juridically declared) will make the
World Court respected and adhered to.
The World Court does not directly touch the citizen, the
national, in his individual rights and capacities except as he is
an integral part of a greater whole-his nation.
The Court has yet to come into the consciousness of the
average national; yet to make its way with him and appeal
to his sense of justice and progress. But that is all coming.
Created on December 16th, 1920, under Article Fourteen
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of the League of Nations Covenant, the Court began with
these broad jurisdictional grants:"The Court shall be competent to hear and determine
any dispute of an international character which the parties
thereto submit to it."
The court may also give advisory opinions upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or Assembly of
the League.
The World Court has jurisdiction of all cases submitted to it by states, all cases under treaties or conventions,
and a wide jurisdiction under a special jurisdictional clause
for all nations accepting such jurisdiction and covering interpretation of treaties, questions of international law, existence
of any fact which constitutes a breach of international law and
the nature or extent of reparation to be made for any such
breach, and the interpretation of any court judgment.
In adjudicating and deciding matters before it the Court
may avail itself of, and apply international conventions and
established usages of member states, international custom,
general principles of law recognized by all nations, and judicial decisions and teaching of publicists.
Here is scope and power sufficient to mould the thoughts,
purposes and habits of the peoples of the world to a new international order. The breadth of it takes away the breath and
would be stimulating to any jurist, even without the vision
of a Marshall.
Let us take one single instance of interpretation that may
arise :-the preamble of the League covenant recites among
other things that it is formed to
"promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace
and security, by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war."

The Kellogg Peace Treaty provides thatArt. 1.

"The high contracting powers solemnly declare . . . that they

condemn recourse to war and renounce it respectively as an instrument of
their national policy towards each other."

Here are two declarations renouncing war that must be
read together and that bring even America into the sweep of
the World movement for peace through a World Court, en-
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forcing and giving effect to the preamble of the League of
Nations.
Some Judge will be found who has courage and vision
and those powers of profound logic which will enable him to
chart the course of the nations, as he reads the charter of the
League and Court and applies them to some concrete case
before him.
We must not forget that Marshall was helped by other
unifying forces making for national cohesion and a stronger
central government, but he had neither the railroad nor telegraph .and none of those marvelous mechanical inventions that
have bound America into a unit.
The World Court starts with a physical and material
equipment between the nations that is far more effective in
moulding the peoples of the world together and clarifying
misunderstanding than had Marshall in his day.
The decisions of the Court can be known throughout the
civilized world in twenty-four hours after they are rendered.
The airplane and radio have obliterated international boundary lines and the voice of the Court itself could be heard
beyond the seas. There is, too, a new sense of international
unity in the world that scarcely existed among the states when
Marshall began his great career. There is a growing demand
for peace among all peoples and to that deepest impulse of
mankind the Court can, in future decisions, give form and
force and effect.
Why may we not look with confidence to the World Court
to forge the new links in the chain of brotherhood between
peoples of the earth?
Perhaps the statesman, the soldier and executive (with
all their commendable activity), may not solve this problem.
Why may we not expect a Court with its calm atmosphere,
its careful judicial process, its wise judgments, without heat
or haste, not based on the whims and caprices of the moment
or the wild notions of the mob-mind but sustained by judicially ascertained facts and ennobled by the highest reason and the
real hopes of mankind, to interpret the conflicting rights of
the nations so justly that even the hostile and defeated state
will accept the judgment; to keep all nations in their proper
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sphere and avoid all forces that seek to erect or maintain a
super state, by adjusting in delicate balance, the centripetal
and centrifugal forces that are operating in the world today;
to give small and weak states a forum into which they may
come with confidence and safety; to soundly interpret the
great charter of the League and Court and the solemn covenants of the nations to renounce war.
Here are tasks for many a Marshall.
Upon its decisions will rest the success not only of the
Court itself but the validity and value of the covenants that
have arisen since the world war.
When the nations and the peoples of the world are once
convinced that they have a forum that is more than a foruma Court-deciding with impartiality, with sound reasoning
and breathing a spirit of judicial integrity, then they will feel
about the World Court as Americans came to feel about the
court presided over by John Marshall.
This will then be a world of law-orderly, united; and
the process of civilization will have advanced a far step.

NOTE: At the request of various members of the Association, President John H. Denison-has appointed a'committee
to investigate the question of adhesion by the United States
to the World Court, which matter comes up soon before the
United States Senate for action. The committee consists of
L. Ward Bannister, Chairman, Will Shafroth, J. H. Pershing,
George F. Dunklee and Roger H. Wolcott. At the next meeting, Monday, January 13, Mr. Bannister will present the report of the committee, which should be of keen interest to all
members of the Association.

